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Myths of Commonwealth Betrayal: UK-Africa Trade Before and After 
Brexit 
 
 
Abstract 
This article critically interrogates claims that a British exit from the European 
Union (Brexit) will create opportunities for the UK to escape the EUÕs apparent 
protectionism and cumbersome internal politics in order to pursue a more liberal 
and globalist trade agenda based on the Commonwealth. Taking a historical view 
of UK and EU trade relations with the Commonwealth in Africa, I highlight the 
way in which the incorporation of the majority of Commonwealth states into the 
EU's preferential trading relationships has reconfigured ties between the UK and 
its former colonies over time. Further, I suggest that the EUÕs recent attempts to 
realise a vision for an ambitious set of free trade agreements in Africa Ð the 
Economic Partnership Agreements Ð was disrupted not by EU protectionism or 
internal politics but rather by African resistance to the EUÕs liberal agenda for 
reciprocal tariff liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation. The UK therefore 
faces a complex challenge if it is to disentangle its trade relations with Africa 
from those of the EU and to forge its own set of ambitious free trade agreements 
with African partners. 
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Introduction 
Leading campaigners for a British exit from the European Union (Brexit)  Ð 
including Boris Johnson, David Davis, Daniel Hannan, Fraser Nelson and the 
leave.eu group Ð made frequent reference to the Commonwealth in their remarks 
on trade both before and after the June 2016 referendum on UK membership of 
the EU (Dominiczak, 2013; Davis, 2016; Nelson, 2011; Hannan, 2016; Leave.eu, 
2016). Specifically, the 53-member Commonwealth group, comprising primarily 
former British colonies, was cited as the basis for an ambitious agenda for a 
series of new British trade agreements following a vote to leave the EU. 
Frequently, the starting point for these arguments by prominent leave 
campaigners was the suggestion that by entering the European Economic 
CommunityÕs (EEC) preferential trading arrangements in 1973, the British 
Òbetrayed our relationships with the CommonwealthÓ (Boris Johnson, quoted in 
Dominiczak, 2013; see also, Lea, 2011). Moreover, this moment of apparent 
betrayal has become symbolic in British Eurosceptic discourse of the way in 
which the UK turned its back on the world Ð and particularly historic friends and 
partners Ð and instead adopted a continentally focused and less ambitious 
foreign economic policy when it joined the EEC. As Ben Wellings and Helen 
Baxendale (2015) put it, enthusiasm for the Commonwealth in Eurosceptic 
thought Ôis significant first and foremost for what it says about a certain [É] 
conception of Britain and EnglandÕs place in the world.Õ Furthermore, calls for a 
return to the Commonwealth have also been part of a broader Eurosceptic 
critique of the EU as a trade policy actor. Here, David Davis (2016) has suggested 
that the EUÕs need to balance the interests of 27 member states when negotiating 
trade deals with external partners Ôhas had dire consequences for the UKÕ, in 
particular in relation to trade links with the Commonwealth. The EUÕs 
  4 
cumbersome internal negotiating structures Ð as well as Òprotectionist forces in 
EuropeÓ (Boris Johnson, quoted in Ross et al., 2016) Ð are claimed to act as a 
constraint on the UKÕs ability to make trade links in the wider world. In sum, 
references to the Commonwealth by leading members of the campaign for Brexit 
fed into a narrative in which, in terms of trade policy, the UK referendum on EU 
membership amounted to a choice between the EUÕs apparent parochialism and 
protectionism and the UKÕs historic globalism and liberalism (see Siles Brgge, 
2016). 
 
It is tempting to dismiss calls for a post-Brexit return to the Commonwealth, as 
the EconomistÕs Bagehot (2011) does, as Ôthe ultimate Eurosceptic fantasyÕ. 
Indeed, such allusions to a past era of British imperial power seem to wilfully 
ignore BritainÕs relative global decline over the course of the twentieth century as 
well as the brutal exploitation that was a central feature of BritainÕs imperial 
history.1 However, this narrative takes on a new significance in a context in 
which leading leave campaigners who have made claims about a possible return 
to the Commonwealth Ð in particular Boris Johnson and David Davis Ð are now 
in prominent cabinet positions responsible for Brexit. Furthermore, as outlined 
above, the Commonwealth enthusiasm of leave campaigners feeds into a broader 
set of claims about EU trade policy and the options for Britain after Brexit. My 
aim in this article is therefore to interrogate the myth of Commonwealth betrayal 
and associated claims that the post-Brexit UK can build a more liberal and 
globalist trade policy that takes the Commonwealth as its starting point. I do so 
by examining the history of and prospects for UK and EU trade relations with 
Africa Ð the continent that is home to the largest number of Commonwealth 
countries (18 out of 53) Ð before and after Brexit. 
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I make two key claims. First, I suggest that far from being betrayed by the UKÕs 
EEC accession, the majority of Commonwealth countries Ð including those in 
Africa Ð were instead incorporated into the EECÕs system of preferential trade 
relations through the creation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. 
As a result, the UKÕs trade relations with Commonwealth countries in Africa are 
now intricately intertwined with the EUÕs own system of external economic 
relations. In this sense, there is no straightforward choice between the EU and 
the Commonwealth. Rather there exists a complex set of EU trade relationships 
with Commonwealth countries to which the UK is party, and that will provide 
the context in which the UK forges any new trade partnership with African 
countries or regions. Second, I argue that more recent developments in EU trade 
relations with Africa do not bear out claims of EU protectionism. Instead, the EU 
has pursued an ambitious set of regional free trade agreements in Africa (as well 
as the Caribbean and Pacific), known as the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). The outcome of the EPA negotiations has in most cases fallen short of 
the EUÕs agenda for comprehensive liberalisation, but this had little to do with 
the internal workings of the EU or its supposedly protectionist trade policy 
outlook. Rather, the EUÕs ambitious liberalisation agenda met with extensive 
resistance from African countries which objected to both the proposed content of 
the EPAs (Heron and Murray-Evans, 2016). I therefore conclude the article by 
suggesting that forging a new trade relationship with Commonwealth countries 
in Africa and beyond will be significantly more complex and challenging for the 
UK than the narrative put forward by prominent leave campaigners suggests 
given the legacies of EUÕs existing privileged trade relationship with the ACP 
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and the significant obstacles that the UK is likely to encounter in forging a more 
liberal trade regime in relation to this region. 
 
Accommodating the Commonwealth: The UKÕs European Turn 
The story of UK accession to the EEC and its implications for the Commonwealth 
is significantly more complex than the popular myth of Commonwealth betrayal 
implies. First, contrary to claims of its parochialism and inward-looking 
continentalism, the EEC sought to forge strong external bonds based on the 
maritime empires of its member states from the outset. The French government 
Ð keen to preserve its imperial economic system after the Second World War Ð 
insisted during negotiations for the Treaty of Rome that ÔassociateÕ status be 
granted to the colonies, dependent territories and newly independent former 
colonies of the six founder members of the EEC (Grilli, 1993; Brown, 2002). This 
system of association unilaterally created a reciprocal preferential trade 
arrangement between the EEC members and the mostly African associated 
states and territories, as well as creating the first European Development Fund. 
While France was clearly the driving force behind this initiative, Peo Hansen and 
Stefan Jonsson (2011; 2012) suggest that there was also a broader consensus 
amongst the founders of the European project in favour of an EEC that promoted 
economic integration significantly beyond the European land mass. In particular, 
the incorporation of Africa into the European project via existing colonial 
linkages was envisaged as a way in which Europe could both construct a viable 
geopolitical power bloc and secure access to vital raw materials (Hansen and 
Jonsson, 2012, p. 1033). As more European colonies gained their independence in 
the 1960s, the relationship between the EEC and the former colonies was 
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maintained and extended through the Yaound Conventions of 1963 and 1969 Ð 
this time with an explicit regional focus on Africa.2 
 
While Britain was not a founder member of the EEC, like France it had been 
keen to secure the continuation of its imperial economic system in the post-war 
period. This system was characterised by preferential trade between the UK and 
British colonies and Commonwealth countries, purchase arrangements for 
certain commodities and monetary relations based on the sterling area (Brown, 
2002, p. 44; Ravenhill, 2004, p. 119). BritainÕs first application to join the EEC in 
1961 was in part prompted by a growing awareness of the limited trade 
opportunities offered by the Commonwealth and BritainÕs declining influence in 
the organisation as its membership widened to include newly independent states 
in Africa and Asia. However, the Macmillan government treated this first 
application as Ôan attempt to see whether British conditions, including most 
importantly British commitments to the Commonwealth, could be metÕ (May, 
2013, p. 33). As such, Britain took an uncompromising position in relation to its 
Commonwealth Preference System in these negotiations. The six founder 
members of the EEC, however, were concerned about competition from 
Commonwealth producers of temperate agricultural products (May, 2013, p. 34) 
and Ôproved to be completely averse to the idea of granting meaningful trade 
preferences to relatively affluent countriesÕ (Ward, 2001, p. 165) Ð in particular 
BritainÕs ÔOld DominionsÕ, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. By the time 
General De Gaulle vetoed British membership of the EEC in 1963, it was clear 
that Britain would not be able to join the EEC with its Commonwealth 
Preference System intact. When Britain applied to join the EEC for a third time 
in 1969, the UK government had clearly decided to subordinate the imperative to 
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preserve the Commonwealth Preference System to its desire to gain membership 
of the EEC. This time around, the Heath government minimised consultation 
with the Commonwealth while prioritising special arrangements for New 
Zealand dairy products and Commonwealth sugar over the preservation of its 
preference system as a whole (May, 2013, p. 36).  
 
Both popular narratives of Commonwealth betrayal and academic discussions of 
the consequences of UK accession for the Commonwealth have tended to focus on 
the implications of the end of the Commonwealth Preference System for the Old 
Dominions (May, 2013; Ward, 1997; 2001). UK applications for EEC membership 
had soured relations with these countries (Ward, 2001) and ultimately led to 
their loss of preferential access to the UK market Ð although by this point they 
had largely accepted the inevitability of the UK joining the EEC and had taken 
steps to diversify their exports (May, 2013, p. 36). This selective reading of the 
implications of UK accession to the EEC, however, underplays the way in which 
the majority of Commonwealth countries were not abandoned at the point of UK 
accession but were instead accommodated within the EECÕs existing system of 
preferential trade relations with former colonies.  
 
The six EEC members were more sympathetic to the plight of the newly 
independent Commonwealth developing states than they had been to the Old 
Dominions (Ward, 2001, p. 166). They faced a dilemma, however, about how 
these states could be accommodated within the EECÕs existing system of trade 
preferences. Here, they settled on a formula that followed the EECÕs existing 
region-based approach to relations with former European colonies. In order to 
incorporate the Commonwealth countries, then, the association relationship was 
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expanded to include the Caribbean and Pacific, these regions being deemed to 
share similar production structures and levels of development with the existing 
associates (Brown, 2002, p. 45; Ravenhill, 2004, p. 120). This arrangement 
allowed the EEC to exclude the Old Dominions as well as the larger and more 
diversified developing countries of the South Asian Commonwealth.3 
 
Although the geographic scope of association for the Commonwealth countries 
was set by the 1972 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, the terms of the relationship between the EEC and the newly 
expanded group of associable countries were still to be negotiated. The oil crises 
of the early 1970s as well as unprecedented unity amongst Third World 
governments in calling for a Ônew international economic orderÕ provided the 
backdrop to these negotiations. In this context, existing Yaound members (19 
African states), the associable members of the Commonwealth (21 states in 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and six other African states that wished to 
join the EECÕs preferential trading arrangements came together to form the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, which would negotiate collectively 
with the EEC. The negotiations culminated in the 1975 Lom Convention, which 
granted non-reciprocal trade preferences and a series of lucrative commodity 
protocols for bananas, beef, rum and sugar to the ACP as well as expanding the 
European Development Fund. In this way, the Lom Convention provided terms 
at least as generous as the old Commonwealth Preference System for the 
associable Commonwealth countries. Furthermore, the Lom Convention served 
to cement and institutionalise the privileged trading relationship between the 
UK (through the EEC) and this particular section of the Commonwealth at a 
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time when relations between the UK and the Commonwealth had markedly 
soured since the 1950s.  
 
When it joined the EEC, then, Britain did not so much betray the Commonwealth 
as secure the incorporation of the majority of its members into a set of broader 
European external economic relations at the heart of which was a privileged  
region-based relationship with a group of former European colonies. The UKÕs 
accession also served to transform EEC relations with the Third World, not least 
by expanding their regional focus to include the Caribbean and Pacific as well as 
Africa and more than doubling the number of countries that took a position at 
the apex of the EECÕs system of trade preferences.  
 
The Evolution of EU-Africa Relations 
The Lom Convention was renewed three times between 1975 and 1990. By the 
early 1990s, however, European policymakers had lost faith in non-reciprocal 
trade preferences as a tool for development, arguing that Lom had served to 
lessen the incentives for necessary ACP trade liberalisation and economic 
restructuring. A series of legal rulings against the Lom regime by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
in 1993, 1994 and 1997 served to hasten the arrangementÕs demise. The Cotonou 
Agreement of 2000 set in motion the process by which the Lom Convention 
would be replaced with free trade agreements Ð known as the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) Ð between the EU and a series of ACP regions. 
The EUÕs ambitious agenda for the EPAs went significantly beyond what was 
required to bring the ACP relationship into line with multilateral rules, 
proposing not just reciprocal tariff reductions but the liberalisation of trade in 
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services and regulatory harmonisation in areas such as investment, competition 
and public procurement. 
 
The EPA negotiations proved highly controversial and the EUÕs ability to realise 
its vision for comprehensive trade liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation in 
relation to the ACP turned out to be surprisingly limited and uneven (see Heron 
and Murray-Evans, 2016). The Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) remains the 
only ACP region to have signed a full comprehensive EPA. In Africa, the results 
of the negotiations have been much more limited. EPAs have been concluded 
(although not yet ratified and implemented)4 Ð in West Africa, Southern Africa 
and the East African Community Ð but this came only after the EU had agreed to 
drop its insistence on the inclusion of immediate commitments on services, 
investment, competition and public procurement as well as to soften its stance on 
a range of controversial technical issues. Elsewhere in Africa, regional 
agreements have not been reached. Instead, ÔinterimÕ EPAs are being applied by 
those countries that have been able to come to an agreement with the EU while 
others trade under the EUÕs alternative preference schemes Ð either Everything 
but Arms (EBA) or the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The patchwork 
of trade arrangements that has been left by the EPA negotiations in Africa is 
unsatisfactory for both sides Ð not least because it has potentially disruptive 
implications for African regional integration (Heron and Murray-Evans, 
forthcoming). 
 
The liberalisation achieved by the EPAs in Africa has therefore been modest. Yet 
suggestions that the EUÕs difficulties in trade negotiations are down to internal 
disagreement or protectionism do not stand up in this case. In terms of their 
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market access offer to ACP countries, the EPAs were generous Ð the EU made it 
clear that all ACP countries that signed an EPA would receive duty free access to 
the EU market for all products except arms under more favourable rules of origin 
than other EU preference schemes.5 Indeed, Gabriel Siles-Brgge (2014a, p. 17) 
suggests that the EPAs became part of a trade agenda in which the European 
Commission sought actively to trade away remaining Ôpockets of protectionÕ in 
Europe in exchange for reciprocal liberalisation in third countries. The most 
frequent criticism of the CommissionÕs approach to the negotiations that came 
from ACP countries, civil society groups and EU member states (including the 
UK!6) did not relate to protectionism, but rather the CommissionÕs excessive 
demands for reciprocal tariff liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation from 
the ACP. The key obstacle to agreement on comprehensive EPAs in Africa, then, 
was the fact that African governments on the whole were not persuaded of the 
merits of comprehensive trade liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation in 
relation to the EU and were instead keen to preserve the regulatory autonomy 
that they deemed necessary for the implementation of trade and industrial 
policies designed to spur development (Heron and Murray-Evans, 2016; Murray-
Evans, 2015). The EUÕs demand for increasing regulatory convergence and the 
ACPÕs resistance to this agenda mirrors a North-South cleavage that can also be 
found in multilateral trade negotiations (Gallagher, 2014) and that is likely to 
also prove a barrier to the realisation of any ambitious liberalisation in Africa 
pursued by the post-Brexit UK. 
 
UK-Africa Trade After Brexit: Return to the Commonwealth? 
The intertwinement of UK external trade relations with its EU membership 
means that there can be no straightforward return to the Commonwealth as a 
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blank slate for a new globalist UK trade strategy. Instead, existing trade 
relations between the EU and Africa will provide the context and create 
incentives that are likely to shape the post-Brexit trade regime in this region. 
Upon leaving the EU, the UK will cease to be party to EU trade agreements and 
third countries will lose any preferential access to the UK market that those 
agreements currently confer. The default for African countries that currently 
access the UK market through either an EPA or one of the EUÕs other preference 
schemes (EBA or GSP) is that they will lose this preferential access to the UK 
market once the UK leaves the EU. They will then access the UK market on the 
basis of WTO most favoured nation tariffs (i.e. at the same rate as any other 
WTO member that does not have a preferential arrangement with the UK). 
Although trade with the UK accounts for only 3.6 percent of total African goods 
exports (International Trade Centre, 2016) any loss of preferential market access 
would have a significant impact on particular countries and industries that 
currently benefit from preferential access (for example, KenyaÕs cut flower 
producers, see Isalanoh 2016). There will therefore be pressure from African 
governments and British development NGOs to make sure that vulnerable 
African economies do not lose existing preferential access to the UK market 
following Brexit. There are three main ways in which the loss of African 
preferences could be avoided. 
 
First, and perhaps most straightforward, the UK could seek to ÔgrandfatherÕ 
existing EU trade agreements with African countries in order to maintain the 
status quo. This would involve offering those countries that have signed an EPA 
a parallel trade deal with the UK on the same or similar terms and setting up a 
unilateral arrangement similar to the EUÕs Everything but Arms, which provides 
  14 
unilateral trade preferences for United Nations designated Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). There are at least two potential problems with this approach. 
First, replicating the existing EU model of trade relations with Africa would also 
replicate its problems Ð in particular the inconsistencies between the patchwork 
of EPAs and existing African regional integration projects. Second, African 
countries and regions may not be willing to sign new agreements with UK on the 
same terms as the EPAs, given the UKÕs smaller market and the uncertainty 
surrounding its post-Brexit relationship with the EU. 
 
A second option that would avoid the patchwork of arrangements currently in 
place between the EU and Africa is for the UK to unilaterally offer duty and 
quota free access to the UK market to all African countries. The key obstacle to 
this approach is multilateral trade rules, which specify that non-reciprocal 
preference schemes should not discriminate between developing countries. While 
the category of developing country has never been adequately defined in WTO 
law (Heron, 2013, p. 22), the widely divergent levels of development amongst 
African countries means that a preference scheme that covered the whole 
continent while excluding developing countries in other regions would be unlikely 
to be deemed compatible with WTO rules. The UK could seek a WTO waiver 
similar to that granted for the USAÕs African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), but reaching agreement on this would require the investment of 
significant political and negotiating capital. Alternatively, a report by the Center 
for Global Development suggests that the UK could set up a preferential trade 
arrangement that is Ôgenuinely non-discriminatory and generalized in 
applicationÕ Ð i.e. a scheme that covers a broader set of developing countries than 
the EUÕs Everything but Arms but does not discriminate based on region 
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(Anderson et al., 2016, p. 10). Such an arrangement, however, might not be 
supported by the existing ACP group, since it would remove the preference 
margin that ACP countries currently enjoy vis--vis non-ACP developing country 
competitors. Furthermore, the UK might be unwilling to offer a unilateral 
preference scheme that benefitted middle income and emerging economies like 
Brazil and India since this would undermine the UKÕs leverage in reaching 
reciprocal free trade agreements with these potentially important export 
partners.7 
 
Finally, the UK could seek a more ambitious set of free trade agreements with 
African countries and regions than is currently in place under the relatively 
limited EPAs. The British Conservative governmentÕs interest in free trade deals 
with developing countries was hinted at in recent media reports which suggested 
that ministers would seek to ÔleverageÕ the UKÕs aid relationships in order to 
reach post-Brexit free trade deals (Swinford and Riley-Smith, 2016). Likewise, 
new Secretary of State for International Development Priti Patel has strongly 
suggested that the UKÕs development relationships will be deployed Òfirmly in 
our national interestÓ (quoted in Stone, 2016). Like the EU, the UKÕs offensive 
trade agenda is likely to focus on services and regulatory issues to a greater 
extent than tariff reductions, since it is here that the most significant gains for 
UK companies are likely to be made. However, given that the key obstacle to 
realising a similarly ambitious liberalisation agenda in the EPAs was African 
opposition, as opposed to intra-EU dynamics or European protectionism, it is 
difficult to see why the UK on its own would be in a better position to reach such 
deals with African countries than the much larger EU. Given the UKÕs severely 
limited negotiating capacity,8 it would be a bold move to launch complex and 
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probably highly contested negotiations based on an ambitious trade and 
regulatory agenda with countries in Africa most of which are ultimately of 
marginal significance as UK export destinations. 
 
What all of this suggests is that any attempt by the UK to forge a new and 
ambitious set of trade links with the Commonwealth in Africa is likely to be 
hugely complex and challenging. The reasons for this, as I have shown in this 
article, are twofold. First, existing UK trade relations with the Commonwealth in 
Africa (as well as the Caribbean and Pacific) were decisively shaped by the 
incorporation of these countries into the EUÕs system of preferences in 1973 and 
by the subsequent evolution of the trade relationship between the EU and the 
ACP countries from the Lom Convention to the EPA negotiations. It is this set 
of existing arrangements Ð as opposed to the existence of the Commonwealth as a 
blank state for a new globalist UK trade strategy Ð that provides the context in 
which the UKÕs post-Brexit trade relationship with Africa will be forged. As 
outlined above, the EPAs provide a possible (if not unproblematic) template for 
post-Brexit UK-Africa trade relations as well as creating incentives that shape 
the desirability of possible alternative UK-Africa trade arrangements. Second, 
although the preferred option for the current UK government might be to seek to 
forge a new set of more ambitious trade agreements with African countries or 
regions, the EUÕs experience with the EPAs demonstrates the considerable 
obstacles to realising such an aim. Indeed, new UK free trade agreements rely to 
a considerable extent on the willingness of potential partners to engage with the 
sort of regulatory harmonisation that is likely to be at the heart of the UKÕs trade 
agenda. In Africa, there is considerable resistance to this agenda.  
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Ultimately, the case of trade with Africa reveals the intertwinement of the UKÕs 
trade relationship with the Commonwealth and its EU membership as well as 
the very significant challenges that the UK faces in disentangling these 
relationships and realising the aim of forging a new globalist trade agenda with 
Commonwealth at its heart. More broadly, this case calls into question attempts 
by leave campaigners to draw a sharp distinction between the EUÕs apparent 
parochialism and protectionism and the UKÕs historic globalism. Instead, it 
demonstrates both the EUÕs active cultivation of external trade arrangements Ð 
especially based on former colonial linkages in Africa Ð and the extent to which 
its recent approach to these relationships has been shaped by a liberal emphasis 
on reciprocal trade liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation. Its lack of 
success in realising this vision has been largely down to external resistance as 
opposed to internal disagreement or protectionism. 
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Notes 
 
1 While the link between the Commonwealth and the British Empire is usually 
left unspoken in British Eurosceptic discourse, it was made explicit in a recent 
tweet by Conservative MP and assistant whip Heather Wheeler, who highlighted 
that the states of the former British Empire had outperformed both the post-
Brexit EU and the rest of the world at the Rio 2016 Olympics and linked this to 
the UKÕs forthcoming efforts to reach trade agreements with Ôour Commonwealth 
friendsÕ (Quinn, 2016). 
2 While non-African French and Dutch dependent territories were included in the 
original group of associates, these territories were not included in the Yaound 
Conventions, which were signed by the EEC and the ÔAssociated African and 
Malagasy StatesÕ. 
3 As John Ravenhill (2004, p. 43, fn. 4) notes, the coincidence of development and 
geography was not perfect, with very poor Commonwealth countries such as 
Bangladesh being designated non-associable on the basis of geography. India, 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka later signed separate trade agreements with the EEC 
on less favourable terms to those offered to the associates (Brown, 2002, p. 45). 
4 At the time of writing, the EPAs concluded by West Africa and the East African 
Community in 2014 have not yet been signed. The EPA between Southern Africa 
and the EU has been signed but not yet ratified by national governments. 
5 South Africa Ð which the EU considers to be a developed country and which has 
received a separate market access deal ever since it acceded to the Lom 
Convention in 1997 Ð was excluded from this offer. 
6 In 2006, UK trade minister Ian McCartney and development minister Gareth 
Thomas sent an open letter to the European Commission expressing concern 
about Ôthe current state of the negotiationsÕ and suggesting that ACP countries 
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should not be forced to accept new rules on foreign investment or competition law 
under the EPAs (Beattie 2006). Similarly in 2013, the UKÕs coalition government 
signed a letter alongside trade and development ministers from France, Ireland 
and the Netherlands in which they urged the Commission to adopt a more 
accommodating approach to ACP concerns and demands (Roquefeuil 2014). 
7 Gabriel Siles Brgge (2014b) describes similar motivations behind recent EU 
reforms to its GSP. 
8 Reports suggest that the UK has only a handful of the 500 to 700 experienced 
trade negotiators that will be needed for post-Brexit talks with the EU, WTO and 
other trade partners (Gonzlez Durntez, 2016; Parker et al., 2016). 
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